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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
JULIA HARRIS,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
Case No. 9564

vs.
ELMO L. HARRIS,
Defendant-Appellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF
STATEMENT OF FACT
There are some additional matters which
plaintiff feels should be added 'to defendant's Statement of Fact. With respect to the entering of the
judgment of $4500.00, this miatter was entered
upon a stipulation between plaintiff and defendant
in open court. The testimony of the parties and their
counsel is as follows: (R. 21)
"THE COURT: There is no question I take
it that the sum of forty-six five, that is,
$4,605 would be due and owing if this decree
isn't modified.
"MR. IVERSON: I think that is approximately right. There wouldn't be but two or
1
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three matters that Mr. Harris says have
been omitted from her accounting.
"THE COURT: Well, I imagine Mr. McCullough would take $4'500 and wouldn't fuss.
"MR. McCULLOUGH: We will accept
forty-five hundred. Is that agreeable?
"'THE COUR'T : Do you?
'"MR. IVERSON: Yes, we will stipulate that
if she is entitled to judgment, that she is entitled to $4500.00."
With respect to the court's statement at R. 60
of the record in holding the defendant in contempt,
the court stated:
"THE COURT: I don't care anything about
this borrowing. The defendant is in contempt
since he's been working at Sperry's by "MR. IVERSON: If Your Honor please" THE COURT: -sixty dollars instead of
the one hundred, and whether he 'borrowed
at other times I wouldn't be interested."
At the time the decree of divorce was entered
( R. 24) the defendant was out of work, had no
money, and was suffering from a double hernia
and could not do heavy work. Yet the court in entering the decree of divorce on the lOth of February,
1956, by the Honorable Parley S. Norseth (R. 9)
ordered the defendant to pay to plaintiff for the
support and maintenance of the children the sum
of $50.00 per month per child.
With respeet to the $1,500 loan which defendant
2
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claims he borrowed from his sister and is paying
back at the rate of $10.00 per month, it is interesting to note the defendant's testimony at pageR. 28
of the record:
"Q. By the way, where did you get the fifteen hundred dollars to invest?
"A. I borrowed it from my sister.
"Q. What is her name?
"A. Donna Petty.
"Q. How much of it have you repaid?
"A. I haven't !any of it repaid yet."

With respect to defendant's earnings and takehome pay, at R. 28 of the record, he testified:
"Q. Now, what is your present take-home
pay?
"A. It averages around sixty-eight dollars
a week or around three hundred a month
practically you could say take-home pay.
"Q. That is approximately three hundred
dollars a month. Now, during all this time
that you were out of work, what did you do
for money?
"A. I had to depend on my sister, I guess.

Defendant testified with respect to his expenses
per month (R. 30 and 31) rent $71.00, groceries
$60.00, utilities including telephone and electric
power $16.00, clothing '$10.00, b!arber $5.00, laundering and cleaning $8.00; that with respect to trans3
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portation, he uses his wife's automobile which she
purchased solely from her own funds, but that he
maintains it a:t an expense of from $35.00 to $40.00
per month.
With respect to the money which defendant
claims to have paid the plaintiff for the support
of the children, the defendant cl·aims $60.00 per
month since working at Sperry, plus $10.00 "that
he spends on the children." At page 32 of the record
the defendant states:
''A. She's loaned me the money to go and
get them fixed because I haven't been able to
save enough outside of my living conditions
and paying her sixty ra month and spending
ten on the kids, seventy, I had my hands full.
I couldn't do it."
With respect to the amount of money the defendant gives or spends on the children, the defendant testified: ( R. 32-3'3)
"Q. Now, what moneys have you given to
the children, or how often do you give them
moneys and whatMR. McCULLOUGH: I object to that,
Your Honor. I think it is irrelevant what he
gives to the kiddies.
THE COURT: The objection is sustained. He may be charitable, but this court
is not interested in his charity. It is only interested in whether he is abiding by the order
of the court.
"Q. Did you have occasion to purchase a
bicycle for the boy sometime ago?
4
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MR. McCULLOUGH: Object to it"A. y es, sir.
.
MR. McCULLOUGH: -Your Honor.
"Q. Wait just a minute.
·THE COURT: The answer will be
stricken. the objection is sustained.
With respect to the affirmative defense of estoppel raised by the defendant, the defendant testified that he had a ·conversation with the plaintiff
in June, July or August of 1956, and defendant
testified as follows: ( R. 35-38)
"A. It was around in August of the same
year.
"Q. All right, August of 1956?
"A. June, July or August.
"Q. Do you recall the first conversation
where you were and where she was?
"A. Well, she lived in the apartments there
on First South. I forget the name of them now.
"Q. Is that where the conversation was had?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And this would be in August in the
apartment that she was living in?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Do you remember the street that it was
on?
"A. First South between Fourth and - I
forget the name of the apartments now. First
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South and Fourth East, somewhere in there.
"Q. All right, tell us what she said and what
you said.
"A. She just said that she knew I had been
out of work and to give her whatever I could,
any little amount would help, and that she
was working now, and every little bit I sent
her would help a lot, and I would try and
give her as much as I could.
"Q. Well, what else was said? Was there
'anything said about the- what you told us
about before, Mr. Robbins?
"A. Was that 'before Mr. Robbins or after?
"Q. I am asking you.
"A. Oh, she said she would sure like me to
keep these creditors off her 'back, so that she
wouldn't have no trouble with her work, and
she would be perfectly happy to accept whatever I could afford as long as I kept these
creditors away from her place of business,
because she said she would get fired if they
came around there garnisheeing her wages.
"Q. Had she already been garnisheed?
"A. One week there she had.

* * * *
"Q. Is that the first time you had the conversation over this matter that you keep these
creditors off her back?
"A. Yes, sir.

* * * *
"Q. All right, now, h'ave you since this first
conversation that you told us about had any
6
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further conversations concerning the matter
of your relationships in regard to the payment
of the support money for the children with
your wife?
"A. No, I have had happy relations up until
this month. I thought she was satisfied the
way things were going."
During the last ye ar and a half prior to the
hearing, the defendant testified that he had been
paying the sum of $70.00 per month to the plaintiff
for the support and maintenance of the children.
( R. 38, 39) Defendant testified at R. a9 of the
record that he had been married two years in August of 1961; that at the time he was married they
had no furniture; that since they married they have
acquired some and that his wife had paid for all
of it. Defendant further testified that he felt the
maximum he could pay for the support of the children was the sum of $70.00 per month. (R. 40) Based
upon the one conversation which the defendant
claims to have had with the plaintiff with respect
to his defense of estoppel, the defendant testified
as R. 42:
1

"Q. Now, if your wife had not told you that
she would be satisfied if you paid the creditors and kept them satisfied and ~as much as
you could possibly afford, what would you
have done, Mr. Harris?
MR. McCULLOUGH: I object to that" A. I would have 7
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MR. McCULLOUGH: -as irrelevant,
immaterial, incompetent, Your Honor. He
knew what the order of the court was.
THE COURT: I will let him say. Go
~ahead.

"A. I would have got hold of an attorney
and had it reduced to what I could pay, If
I didn't think she was happy with the set-up."
With respect to defendant's living expenses,
on cross-examination the defendant testified at R.

46:
"Q. Now, you say you spend seventy-one
dollars for rent. Is that correct?
"A. Yes, sir.
''Q. Is tha:t the full amount of the rent for
your apartment?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Your wife doesn't pay any portion of
that?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. You spend sixty dollars a month for
food?
"A. Yes, sir.
"Q. Does your wife pay any portion of that?
"A. She buys things from time to time."
With respect to defendant's defense of estoppel,
the plaintiff testified at R. 52 of the record:
"Q. Mrs. Harris, have you ever at any time
since the entering of the decree of divorce,
8
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either orally or in writing or in any manner,
told your husband or your former husband or
indicated to him that he did not have to pay
the full amount of the money set forth in the
decree?
"A. No. In fact, I have asked him to the contrary. I have 'always asked for more."
The home in which the plaintiff lives was purchased by the plaintiff, her sister, and her mother,
and stands in the name of all three. (R. 54) However, the sister does not live with them any longer.
(R. 53, 54)
With respect to the earnings of plaintiff's son,
the plaintiff testified at R. 55:
"Q. And how much does the boy e!arn on his
paper route?
"A. This last month he earned eight dollars.
Some months he earns fourteen, and the highest he's ever earned was twenty-eight dollars.
"Q. What would he average, about twenty
dollars a month?
"A. I would say so."

With respect to the pl aintiff's expenses per
month, the plaintiff testified at R. 55:
1

"Q. · Now, taking out what your sister has
heretofore been paying you, there's four hundred thirty-five dollars a month. Can't you
live on four hundred thirty-five dollars 'a
month and feed the two children and your
mother and yourself in that home?
9
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"A. Well, I could if I had that coming in.
We have had repairs on the house. We bought
an old home, and we have had appliances go
out. We lrave got to have it painted now, and
my children both of them need an orthodontist
right now at the present time, and that is what
I really need money for now, and I have got
a boy with hay fever, and he is suffering so
'bad I have got to take him and have ~a series
of shots, which are very expensive from the
doctor, and the children are costing a lot more
now than they Further at R. 57:
''Q. Tell us what besides board and room
you have to supply the children.
"A. My boy has two front teeth broken half
way off. They both have got to be repaired,
and it is about a hundred dollars for each
one of those.
"A. All right.
"A. And my daughter has got to go to an
orthodontist or have surgery on her molars
that I couldn't take care of at the time I
should have, and it is going to cost me a tremendous amount of money to get that taken
care of now. I don't know how much, but I
know it is going to be over two hundred dollars
"Q. All right. What ordinary, constantly recurring expenses do you have besides food
and shelter.
"A. I have doctor bills. I h ave - the children - my boy belongs to the Boy Scouts. It
1

10
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just cost me twelve dollars last month. He
has to pay those dues, and I have to keep them
clothed. I don't know all what you mean, but
I don't have enough money to take care of
them for the things that they need at the present time."
Further wirth respect to the defense of the defendant with respect to estoppel, the plaintiff testified at R. 58 :
1

"Q. And you had no conversation at all with
him about him taking care of these obligations
on which you were jointly liable and that as
long as he paid what he could for the children
you would be satisfied?
''A. No, I never said that.
"Q. You never said ;anything like that?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Have you ever told that to his sister?
"A. No, sir.
"Q. Do you know his sister?
''A. Yes, I know his siter.
"Q. She's loaned him money on various occasions to help keep the family when he hasn't
had enough, hasn't she?
MR. McCULLOUGH: Object to it as
irrelevant, immaterial, and incompetent, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: If the witness knows,
she may answer.
"Q. Do you know whether his sister has loan11
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ed money to him for the support of the family
when he's been out of work?
"A. Not for the support of his family, no,
never.
''Q. What was the money for?
"A. When he had an invention and was to
get a patent for an invention of his, she loaned some money.
Further on page 59:

'·'Q.

I see. But at le'ast you have taken no
of any kind against Mr. Harris to collect anything more than the amounts that he
has been paying to you up until the last thirty
days?
''A. I have :asked him every time I have seen
him that I need more money.
~'Q. But you have done nothing about any
action. Is that correct?
"A. He keeps promising that he will do it,
and I never have until it came-"
a~tion

The lower court found as set forth in the Findings of Fact '(R. 66):
"4. That during the period of said delinquency the plaintiff made constant andrepeated demands upon defendant to make said
support money payments; that defendant failed and refused to make the payments as set
forth in the order of the court dated the 1Oth
of February, 1956."

12
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1.
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN ENTERING JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF PLAINTIFF AND
AGA:INST THE 'DE'FENDANT FOR $4 500. FURTHER,
THE TRIAL COURT 'DID NOT MISAPPLY THE LAW
APPL I'CABLE TO SAID 1POINT IN I'SSUE.
1

1

As set forth in plaintiff's Statement of Facts,
the sum of $4500 was agreed to by plaintiff and defendant in open court as the sum that judgment
would be rendered for, if plaintiff was in fact entitled to judgment. Defendant's main contention is
that the plaintiff was estopped to claim said judgment by reason of her actions. Plaintiff has set
forth the testimony in full of the defendant with
respect to what he claimed were the grounds for
estoppel, and plaintiff refers the court to p11aintiff's
Statement of Fact. It should be remembered, however, that according to the defendant's own testimony there was but one conversation with the plaintiff with respect to these grounds for estoppel, and
that was in June, July or August of 19S6, and defendant's testimony was as follows:
"She just said that she knew I had been out
of work and to give her whatever I could, any
little amount would help, and that she was
working now, and every 'bit I sent her would
help a lot, and I would try and give her as
much as I could.''
Further, "Oh, she said she would sure like me
13
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to keep these creditors off her back so that
she wouldn't have no trouble with her work,
·and she would 'be perfectly happy to accept
whatever I could afford as long as I kept these
creditors away from her place of business
because she said she would get fired if they
came around there garnisheeing her wages."
Further, ''Is that the first time you had the
conversations over this matter - that you
keep the creditors off her back?"
''A. Yes, sir''
Further, "All right, now have you since this
first conversation that you told us about had
any further conversations concerning the matter of your relationships in regard to the payment of the support money for -your children
with your wife?
"A. No, I have had happy relations up until
this month. I thought she was satisfied the
way things were going."
This is the only conversation which the defendant testified to by his own words in which anything
was mentioned to the plaintiff with respect to his
grounds for estoppel. Even as to this one conversation, the plaintiff denied ever having such a conversation and that her total conversation with the defendant at all times was "'I need more money, can't
you give me something more?" or words to this
effect.
Until the defendant was employed at the Sperry
Rand job, his employment was spasmodic and he
was unable to maintain employment because of his
1
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physical condition, which physical condition by the
defendant's own testimony existed at the time the
decree of divorce was entered. The trial court clearly
believed the evidence as submitted 'by the plaintiff
and without question did not believe the evidence
testified to 'by defendant. The trial court found, as
set forth in its Findings of 'Fact, that during the
period of the delinquency plaintiff made constant,
repeated demands upon defendant to make said
support money payments. Under the doctrine recited in the case of Price vs. Price, 4 Utah '2d '153,
289 P. 2d 1044, this court held that if there was evidence adduced at the trial which it 'believed would
support the trial court's 1award, then the judgment
of the lower court could not be disturbed on appeal.
It is interesting to note the comment of the court
at page 154 of the Utah Reports:
"As to 1): Defendant recites facts testified
to by him which he apparently assumes the
court was required to consider as true, but it
is obvious from the trial court's conclusion
that the latter did not believe everything defendant said. Other evidence adduced, if believed, would support the award, and under
familiar principles we cannot disturb the
judgment in such event."
Further, defendant seems to take great comfort
in the fact that while he was flitting from job to
job and unable to hold employment because of his
"physical condition" the fact that plaintiff did not
15
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harass him was a conclusive presumption that the
plaintiff waived her rights. Accordingly, the plaina
tiff is barred from recovering against defendant 'bea
cause of her actions. This court in the case of Openshaw v. Openshaw, 105 Utah 57~4, 1'44 P. 2d 528
at page 579 of the 'Utah reports states:
"But mere inaction or delay short of the period
of limitations, in the enforcement of payment
of an obligation !already accrued, without
more, is insufficient upon which to predicate
laches.
" 'Laches is more than mere lapse of time; its
essence is estoppel.' De Giovacchini v. Teich,
133 N. J. Eq. 107, 30 A. 2d 815, 819. As
stated by this court in Burningham v. Burke
et al, 67 Utah 90, at page 107, 245 P. 977, at
page 983, 46 A.L.R. 446: 'While delay is an
important factor, yet mere delay, unless una
reasonable or inexcusable, is not enough; and
of equal importance are the circumstances
occurring during the delay, the relation of
the parties to the subject, dis!advantages that
may have come through loss of evidence,
change of title, intervention of equities, or injury from other causes.'
"In this case we have searched the record
in vain for any evidence which would even
tend to show that plaintiff misled defendant
to his detriment, or in any other way did anything to injure defendant, make it difficult
or impossible for him to comply with the order
of the court, or persuaded him not to apply to
the court for reduction of the award. The evidence adduced to the effect that on the few
occasions when he visited the children and
16
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their mother in California, the plaintiff did
not harass him for payment or arrearages,
is not sufficient upon which to conclude that
she was guilty of laches. * * * *
"Nor does he show how he has been injured
by her acting on the mistaken belief so induced, nor why he should in equity profit by
his conduct in making the niggardly contribution to her support of approximately $9.50
per month for the five years preceding the
hearing - the amount arrived at by giving
full credence to his own testimony as to such
payments.
"'* * * laches cannot 'be imputed to one who
was ignorant of the facts and for that reason
failed to assert his rights, !and on such
ground, to bar relief against fraud, laches
must not only consist of delay but of a delay
which worked a disadvantage to the opposing
party.' Burningham v. Burke, supra.
"The evidence was clearly insufficient to support the finding or justify the conclusion,
whichever it may be design a ted, of laches.
"The cases cited by respondent to the effect
that laches for m'any years may constitute
a defense to contempt proceedings are no
authority for his contention that the failure
of an aggrieved party to immediately enforce
payment of an a ward of alimony and support
money may be treated as laches.''
Because of defendant's poor '''physical condition" the plain tiff has of necessity been required to
seek employment, which she did immediately after
the divorce decree in order to support herself and
17
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the two minor children. As shown by her testimony
and her repeated demands upon the plaintiff she
has constantly been after the defendant to make addi tion~al payments and to bring the payments to date.
As shown by the plaintiff's testimony, the children
themselves, because of the failure of defendant to
make his payments, have suffered by not having the
proper dental care for their teeth at the time when
they should have been cared for. The court only
has to read the testimony of the pl'aintiff in this
regard to fully understand that because the children
were not receiving the full amount they had to forego the necessary den tal repairs they needed.
It is true the plaintiff has not brought a court
action to secure 'judgment for the delinquency prior
to the instant hearing and the defendant seems to
take great comfort in the fact that if the plaintiff
had wanted the back money that she would have
proceeded with the matter in court. A slight perusal
of the defendant's own testimony with respect to his
earning capacity in the past is indicative of how
futile a court action at such time would have been.
Certainly the defendant cannot say that the plaintiff has waived her rights by failing to bring 'a court
action. By Plaintiff's own testimony it is apparent
that the plaintiff could not waive this right of the
children's support when the children were so definitely in need of that support. Defendant's biggest
18
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argument is to the effect that since the plaintiff is
working and has been since shortly after the decree
of divorce, that he should no longer be required to
comply with the court's order and pay the $100.00
per month for the support of the children, regardless of whether they need it or not. If defendant's
contention in this regard is to be accepted, then any
divorced father can m'erely sit by until his former
wife obtains employment, and then come into court
and say, look my former wife is now working,
therefore, the support payments for the children
should be reduced or entirely eliminated 'as to anything tlrat I have not paid in the past. The defendant's argument is totally without logic.
Defendant quotes from the case of Larsen v.
Larsen, 5 Utah 2d 224, 300 P. 2d 596 for the proposition that since defendant testified with respect
to his grounds for estoppel, even though not believed hy the lower court, that he is now under the
doctrine of the Larsen case relieved of the obligation of any accrued 'arrearages. It should be noted
that the court in this case specifically found that
the evidence was sufficient to support findings for
either party on issue of plaintiff's laches, acquiesance, and equitable estoppel following her recovery.
Therefore, the court remanded it to the trial court
for 'a specific finding with respect to said issue.
The lower court in the instant case has specifically
19
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found in its Finding of Fact (R. 66): "That during
the period of said delinquency, the plaintiff made
constant and repeated demands upon defendant to
make said support money payments, and that defendant failed and refused to make the payments
a.Js set forth 'by the order of the court dated November 10, 1956." And again with respect to defendant's grounds for estoppel, the court should specifically examine the testimony of the one conversation upon which defendant bases his grounds for
estoppel as set forth in the Statement of Fact by
plaintiff. The facts of the Larsen case are entirely
different than those in the instant case; therefore,
said case would have no bearing upon the decision
in this case.
In what way has the defendant changed his
position in order to invoke the doctrine of estoppel?
He was ordered to pay the bills as set forth in the
decree of the court, some of which he paid and some
of which he did not pay. And he was ordered to
make monthly payments to the plaintiff, a portion
of which he has paid and the majority of which
he has not paid.
POINT 2.
THE TRIA'L COURT DID NOT ERR IN REFUSING
TO PER'MIT THE SIS'TER OF THE DEFENDANT,
DONNA PETTY, TO TESTIFY.

·with respect to Po'in t 2 of the defendant's
argument, the defendant set forth in full and the
20
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plaintiff has repeated defendant's statement in her
Statement of Fact, the one conversation upon which
he claims to rely for ·his grounds of estoppel. Certainly the sister of the defendant could not elaborate beyond that particular statement. The matters
as set forth in Point 1 of plaintiff's brief are equally
applicable to Point 2.
POINT 3.
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN FTNDING DE-FENDANT GUILTY OF CONTE'MPT FOR H1S FAILURE
TO MAKE THE FULL PAYMENT SINCE HIS EMPLOYMENT AT S'PERRYS.

The defendant has taken great pains in his
brief to show that although he h!as only paid the
plaintiff the sum of $60.00 per month, that in reality
he has been paying her in full because, as he states,
he was spending $10.00 a month on the children
and, in addition, the plaintiff took the children as
dependents on her income tax return, which gave
her another $20.00 or '$'2'1.00 per month. And, further, that the defendant has maintained since his
employment at Sperrys medical insurance to cover
the medical expenses of the children. The re asoning
of the defendant in these respects no matter how
commendable it may or may not be certainly 'is not
complying with the order of the court as set forth in
the decree of divorce. The decree did not authorize
the defendant to enter into these alternative programs, but made ~a specific requirement that the
1
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defendant pay the sum of $100.00 per month, which
he has not done and has failed and refused to do.
Further, the defendant in setting up his monthly
expenses, pays the entire rent for the apartment for
both himself and his present wife although she is
working. Secondly, he buys the groceries for the
sum of $60.00 per month. When asked if his present
wife paid any portion of the groceries, his statement
was that "she buys things from time to time". Further, the defendant set forth that he is obligated to
spend $8.00 for laundry, $'5.00 for a barber, $10.00
for clothes, $'35.00 or $40.00 per month for an automobile that he doesn't own. Further that they have
accumulated furniture since he married his pres~nt
wife although he has never paid for any portion of
it; they have accumulated !an automobile however he
didn't pay anything with respect to the automobile;
that his present wife has made all of the payments
in that respect. And then again he says he can only
pay $60.00 per month because he has to spend $10.00
per month on the children. Here again this is not the
defendant coming into court with clean hands to
show good cause why he has not complied with the
order of the court, 'but rather ~a defendant trying to
rationalize his expenses so as to justify the amount
which he wants to pay for the support of the niinor
children.
With respect to defendant's contention that he
1
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will lose his job if he is required to spend thirty days
in jail. Certainly the plaintiff is not desirous that
the defendant lose his employment. It has taken him
since 1956 to the present time to dbtain employment
whereby he could in some ha:lf measure comply with
the order of the court and attempt to support his
minor children. The plaintiff does not want him to
lose his job. However, the defendant has got to be
made to realize the necessity of complying with the
court's order and to give his children the support
they are entitled to and which he can afford to pay.
1

POINT 4.
THE TRIAL COURT 'DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN COMMrTTING THE DEFENDANT TO
JAIL FOR THIRTY DAYS.

No argument is necessary with
4 of defendant's brief.

respe~t

to Point

POTNT 5.
'THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING
DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR MODIFICATION OF
THE DIVORCE DECREE TO REDUCE THE AMOUNT
OF SUPPORT MONEY 1PAYABLE BY THE DEFENDANT TO THE PLAINTIFF.

The defendant proved no material change in
circumstance the entering of the divorce decree.
Pursuant to the facts, it was clearly brought out
that defendant, at the time the decree was entered,
was unemployed and was still ordered to pay the
23
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sum of $50.00 per month per child. Since that time
the defendant's position has been bettered measurably. He is now steadily employed earning a net
take-home pay of $300.00 per month. The defend~ant's contention that since the plaintiff is now working therefore the defendant does not need to support the cnildren to the extent that he was required
to do so when he was totally unemployed is without merit. The needs of the children as illustrated
by the plaintiff are adequately set forth in the Statement of Fact of the plaintiff !and will not be duplicated here. However, the court's attention should
be called to such statements of the plaintiff and the
immediate needs of the minor children for dental
care, clothing, and the social needs of the children
~as set forth by the plaintiff.
'Plaintiff respectfully submits that the judgment and order of the ·Third District Coutt should
be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
LELAND S. McCULLOUGH
Attorney for
Plaintiff-Respondent
304 East First South
Salt Lake City, Utah
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